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Wrongs, Rights, and Third
Parties
NICOLAS CORNELL
In philosophical and legal arguments, it is commonly assumed that a
person is wronged only if that person has had a right violated. This
assumption is often viewed almost as a necessary conceptual truth: to be
wronged is to have one’s right violated, and to have a right is to be one
who stands to be wronged. I will argue that this assumption is
incorrect—that having a right and standing to be wronged are distinct
and separable moral phenomena.
My argument begins from cases in which third parties are affected by
the violation of someone else’s rights. I will introduce four general types
of cases in which some third party seems to be wronged even though no
right of hers is violated. These cases arise because we have important
commitments and practices associated with having a right and with
being wronged—commitments and practices that do not always line up
with one another. Only by recognizing that rights and wrongings can
come apart, I argue, can we preserve the roles that both moral phenom-
ena play in our lives.
In addition to more accurately capturing our moral lives, I also believe
that this recognition may be philosophically fruitful. It may add a new
layer to recent work on the directedness of moral obligations. It may offer
a path forward in the stalled debate between interest theories and will
theories over the nature of rights. And, practically speaking, I believe that
it can safeguard against certain common and tempting yet problematic
inferences.
I have benefited greatly from comments from, and discussion with, more people than I
can list in developing this article. Among the most generous were Eric Beerbohm, Matt
Boyle, Christa Cornell, Kory DeClark, Jorah Dannenberg, Emily Dupraz, Micha Glaeser,
John Goldberg, Frances Kamm, Doug Lavin, David Plunkett, T. M. Scanlon, Amy Sepinwall,
Jiewuh Song, and two anonymous editors at Philosophy & Public Affairs, who provided
excellent and extensive suggestions. My greatest debt is to Christine Korsgaard.
© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Philosophy & Public Affairs 43, no. 2
I. RIGHTS AND WRONGS
Certain relationships connect one party with another party morally.
Michael Thompson, for example, describes certain features of morality
as joining the agents in a “practical nexus,” wherein agents are like
“opposing poles of an electrical apparatus” with “an arc of normative
current passing between the agent-poles.”1 Somewhat differently,
Stephen Darwall describes moral reasons as “second personal” in that
they presuppose a relationship of authority of one agent with regard to
another agent.2 The idea is that morality does not just bind agents, but, in
many important cases, it binds one agent to another agent.
The interpersonal character of morality includes both forward-
looking and backward-looking elements. That is, directedness to others
inflects both how we deliberate about what we ought to do going forward
and how we assess and react to actions after they have been performed.
Leading up to an action, our moral relationships with others shape
what reasons we have for acting and how we take these reasons into our
deliberation. A person may owe it to another person to act in a particular
way. In such contexts, the person to whom the action is owed has a sort
of moral entitlement, which is frequently illustrated by that person’s
ability to claim, waive, control, or even transfer the duty in question. We
often characterize this relation by saying that one person has a right that
another act in a particular way. The right describes the way that its bearer
constrains how others ought to act; or, put another way, it describes a
special kind of reason for action.
After an action has been performed (or omitted), a person may be in a
position to hold another accountable for a failure. It may be apt for the
victim to resent the transgressor, complain based on the injury, demand
compensation, or seek to forgive the trespass. The transgressor might
apologize, offer restitution, or feel the guilt of having committed an
injustice. We may describe such relationships by saying that one person
has wronged another. When we say this, we mean more than simply that
the person has acted wrongly—that is, done what she ought not do.
1. Michael Thompson, “What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice,” in
Reason and Value, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), p. 335.
2. Stephen Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountabil-
ity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).
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Rather, the person has done a wrong3 to the other person—that is, there
is someone who has been wronged. When someone is wronged, a par-
ticular moral relationship exists between parties with regard to some
past action.
One question that might reasonably be posed is that of how these
forward-looking and backward-looking relations are connected with
each other. What is the relationship between our ex ante moral entitle-
ments and the moral complaints that we can make ex post? Or, more
simply, how are rights related to wrongs (that is, wrongings)?
Most philosophers, I believe, assume a straightforward answer to this
question: rights and wrongs are opposite sides of the same coin—mirror
images of the same moral relation. According to this view, our ex ante
and ex post moral relations are merely different perspectives on the same
underlying connection. To put the point more precisely, philosophers
tend to accept something like the following claim: X wrongs Y by ϕ-ing if
and only if Y has a right that X not ϕ.
Here is a smattering of examples—from philosophical and legal think-
ers holding otherwise quite diverse conceptions of rights and morality—
that represent this common assumption:
• DAVID OWENS: “What is it to do wrong in a way that wrongs
someone? If X would wrong you by deceiving you then you have a
right against X that he not deceive you; X owes it to you not to
deceive you, he has an obligation to you [to] be truthful to you. And
3. As a purely terminological point, I generally take the word “wrong” in its noun
form—for example, “she committed a wrong”—to mean an instance of wronging. In this
way, the use as a noun is associated with the use as a transitive verb—for example, “she
wronged him.” Thus, wrongs, in my usage, are directed against someone. This use should
be contrasted with uses associated with the adjective “wrong”—the substantival use or use
to imply simply an instance of doing something that is wrong—which would not necessar-
ily imply injustice directed against someone. In other words, I distinguish “she did a
wrong” from “she did wrong.” Not everyone agrees with this usage. David Owens, for
example, distinguishes between “wrongs” and “wrongings.” See David Owens, Shaping the
Normative Landscape (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 45. So, for Owens, “she did
a wrong” means the same thing as “she did wrong,” neither one implying “she wronged
someone.” Out of an abundance of caution, I shall try to use the gerund “wronging” where
there might be significant confusion. But the reader should understand that I generally use
the noun phrases “a wrong” and “a wronging” interchangeably, both meaning more than
just a wrong act.
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owing you the truth is different from merely being obliged to be
truthful.”4
• G.E.M. ANSCOMBE: “A wrong is an infringement of a right. What is
wrong about an act that is wrong may be just this, that it is a
wrong.”5
• E. J. BOND: “If you have a right to something from me, then you can
demand of me that I not violate that right, and if I do violate it I
have done you a wrong. . . . The preceding . . . showed only the
interconnectedness of certain ideas that exist in the common
understanding. . . . [I]f there is such a thing as injustice—and we
know there is—then there are rights, for injustice consists in the
violation of rights.”6
• BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO: “What the plaintiff must show is ‘a wrong’ to
herself, i.e., a violation of her own right. . . . [T]he commission of a
wrong imports the violation of a right. . . . Affront to personality is
still the keynote of the wrong.”7
• JEREMY BENTHAM: “The distinction between rights and offences is
therefore strictly verbal—there is no difference in the ideas. It is not
possible to form the idea of a right, without forming the idea of an
offence.”8
• JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON: “I will use ‘Y wronged X’ and ‘Y did X a wrong’
only where Y violated a claim of X’s. So on my use of these locu-
tions, they entail that Y acted wrongly; but they entail more than
just Y acted wrongly—they entail that Y wrongly infringed a claim
of X’s.”9
What all of these writers share is the same premise—taken for granted or
essentially stipulated—that a wrong and a rights violation are one and
the same thing.
I mean to reject this premise. One may be wronged, I will argue,
without having a right that is violated. In other words, it is not the case
4. Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape, p. 46.
5. G.E.M. Anscombe, “On the Source of the Authority of the State,” in Authority, ed.
Joseph Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 152.
6. E. J. Bond, Ethics and Human Well-Being (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 199–
200.
7. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company, 248 N.Y. 339, 343–44 (1928).
8. Jeremy Bentham, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in The Works of Jeremy
Bentham, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), 3:159.
9. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1990), p. 122.
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that X wrongs Y by ϕ-ing only if Y has a right that X not ϕ.10 In order to
show this, I will appeal to cases in which some third party is injured by
the violation of someone else’s rights. My argument is that such parties
can, at least sometimes, legitimately complain that they have been
wronged. But their complaint need not be linked to some right of theirs.
Rather, their complaint may simply take the form “You have acted
wrongly and injured me as a consequence, and I now hold you account-
able for my injury.” Put another way, parties may sometimes be put in a
special moral position to complain and seek justification ex post, not by
conduct over which they could have asserted any rights claim of their
own ex ante, but rather by conduct that was wrong for other reasons, like
violating someone else’s rights. In this way, I will argue, wrongs can
come apart from rights.11
What this divergence points to, I believe, is the fact that having been
wronged by someone and having a right against someone constitute
distinct relations. Wrongs are not merely the outline left where rights
have been trampled. And rights are more than the glimmer of future
liability. Eliding the two relationships such that they become reciprocals
of each other fails to do justice to either one. The correct picture, I
believe, is more complicated.
II. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
Before turning to the argument itself, I want to begin with some brief
comments about methodology. My argument for giving up the assump-
tion that there is a necessary connection between having a right and
being wronged is driven both by concrete examples and by theoretical
considerations about the different moral functions of these relations.
These two aspects of the argument are deeply connected with each
other. So, although I start with concrete examples, the examples are not
meant to stand on their own. The force of the examples can be fully
appreciated only in light of the roles that our moral relations play, which
I hope to develop as the argument progresses.
10. Although I also am skeptical of the other half of the biconditional—X wrongs Y by
ϕ-ing if Y has a right that X not ϕ—that claim is not the subject of this article.
11. My focus on third-party cases in this article is not meant to imply that these are the
only cases in which wrongs and rights come apart. Quite possibly there are many others. I
use these cases only as a way to show the possibility of divergence.
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In the next four sections, I will describe four types of cases in which it
appears that wrongs diverge from rights. In each type of case, I will
suggest that some third party—the beneficiary of a contract, the down-
stream victim of a lie, the causally affected bystander, and the caring
friend or family member—is wronged despite not having had any right of
their own violated. Within each section, I will offer more than one
example, and the aim is to suggest general patterns rather than to fixate
on any one example. I do not expect a single example to be convincing
on its own.
The reader may be initially inclined to preserve the correlation
between wrongs and rights by explaining the examples differently. There
are two natural tendencies. One is to maintain that the third party in
question is not, in fact, wronged. If this is meant to engage my argument,
then it should not be a merely linguistic point. One might stipulate that
“wrong,” when used as a verb or noun, refers only to rights violations.12
But this would not address the substantive claim that there is an impor-
tant moral relationship—call it what one may—that is not reducible to
having had a right violated. To maintain that the third party is not
wronged in this sense, one must be prepared to say that she does not
have a special moral standing to complain—that, morally, she is like any
other bystander. I think that this is an unsatisfactory thing to say about
the examples that I will offer. Taken collectively, the examples should
suggest the implausibility of this linguistic response. We have settled
commitments about wrongs—commitments about the appropriateness
of complaint, resentment, apology, forgiveness, compensation, and so
on—that cannot be captured by focusing only on rights violations. To
deny flatly the phenomenon of wrongs to third parties is, I think, paying
too great a cost to preserve theoretical neatness.
12. I think that, as a claim about English usage, this description is false. “Wrong” has a
significantly broader use than exclusively for rights violations. For example: “But what if I
think you killed Cock Robin, when as things turn out you did not? I think we might in the
ordinary way say I wronged you and did you a wrong, though it can hardly be thought that
my merely harboring that thought was my violating a claim of yours.” Thomson, The Realm
of Rights, p. 122. I take the linguistic fact that the noun and verb uses of the word “wrong”
are generally broader than only rights violations to strengthen my argument.
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The other tendency, instead of denying that a wrong has been com-
mitted, is to search for rights that might explain these wrongs and pre-
serve the correlation. This response is quite reasonable, and, as I
describe the different examples, I will consider possible explanations
along these lines. But, ultimately, I believe that this kind of response
proves inadequate. And the reason it proves inadequate is that we have
settled commitments about rights and claims—commitments about
how they shape our action, our deliberation, and our expectations of one
another. Positing rights to explain the cases that I describe will not, I
believe, allow us to stay true to these settled commitments. The argu-
ment for this claim will not fully come out until Sections VII, VIII, and IX,
but it nonetheless informs the intervening discussion of the four types of
cases.
III. CASE ONE: THE THIRD-PARTY CONTRACT BENEFICIARY
I will come to the first type of case by way of a brief discussion of the two
classic approaches to thinking about rights. Interest theories, beginning
with Bentham and continuing on through Raz, begin with the basic idea
that rights serve to protect the interests of the rightholder. That is, the
interests or reasons in favor of placing a duty on one party are what
generate the rights of the other party. To have a right, then, is simply to
be the one whose interests are sufficiently strong, or of the appropriate
character, to generate moral obligations protecting them. Speaking
roughly, one might say that the interest theory takes the idea of a prohi-
bition as primary, and infers the related concept of a right.13 Part of what
is attractive about the interest theory is precisely that it reduces the idea
of a right to the seemingly more basic ideas of interests and the injuries
that can be suffered to those interests. A right is explained as a protection
against certain injurious conduct of others.14
According to a different view—the will theory—a right grants the
rightholder normative control over the subject matter of the right. As
13. See, for example, Joseph Raz: “Assertions of rights are typically intermediate con-
clusions in arguments from ultimate values to duties.” Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 181.
14. See, for example, Bentham: “The fundamental idea, the idea which serves to explain
all the others, is that of an offence.” Bentham, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws,
p. 160.
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H.L.A. Hart put it, a rightholder is “a small-scale sovereign.”15 The idea is
that to say that Y has a right that X do ϕ is to say that Y is the one who is
morally entitled to determine what X does with regard to ϕ. By focusing
on the idea of normative control, the will theory attempts to capture the
sense in which the duties that correlate with rights are directional—that
is, owed to another agent. Again speaking roughly, one might say that the
will theory starts with the idea of claim-rights over others; wrongs derive
from the violation of this control.
Because it describes a link between moral agents, the correlation
between wrongs and rights crops up in some of the most famous argu-
ments in favor of the will theory against the interest theory. H.L.A. Hart
offers the following famous example to illustrate the failure of a simple
interest theory of rights.
X promises Y in return for some favor that he will look after Y’s aged
mother in his absence. Rights arise out of this transaction, but it is
surely Y to whom the promise has been made and not his mother who
has or possesses these rights. Certainly Y’s mother is a person concern-
ing whom X has an obligation and a person who will benefit by its
performance, but the person to whom he has an obligation to look
after her is Y. This is something due to or owed to Y, so it is Y, not his
mother, whose right X will disregard and to whom X will have done
wrong if he fails to keep his promise, though the mother may be
physically injured.16
Hart argues—I think convincingly—that the son (Y), and not the mother,
is the rightholder in this case. That is, the contractual duty is owed to Y.
It was to Y that the promise was made. That X did not owe the duty to the
mother is evidenced by the fact that she would not control X’s perfor-
mance. She could not demand or excuse performance.17 In this regard,
Hart’s argument appears convincing.
15. H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 183.
16. H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 180.
17. Hart goes on to make precisely this point: “And it is Y who has a moral claim upon
X, is entitled to have his mother looked after, and who can waive the claim and release Y
from the obligation.” Ibid.
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But the last sentence of the quoted passage strikes me as, in part, false.
Hart says, essentially, that the duty is something owed to Y, and that
therefore it is Y and not the mother who stands to be wronged. The
inference here is rather straightforward, and it is not hard to find the
unstated premise. Hart assumes, without stating it, that a person stands
to be wronged by the absence of something if and only if that something
is owed to the person. This premise underwrites a valid inference: the
duty is owed to Y, not the mother; one stands to be wronged only based
on those things that one is owed; therefore, Y, and not the mother, stands
to be wronged.
It seems to me, however, that we ordinarily would think that the
mother stands to be potentially wronged. She has a stake in the duty that
is owed to her son. Suppose that the promise to Y were broken. I think it
would be mistaken to say that the mother has no complaint, as though
she were akin to any other mere bystander. It would seem perfectly
appropriate for her to resent X’s failure in such a case. Her son arranged
something for her, and as a result of X’s malfeasance, she has not
received it. Furthermore, one can imagine X apologizing to the mother or
the mother forgiving X.18 It is worth noting that, in Anglo-American law,
intended third-party beneficiaries do have standing to bring a complaint
for breach of contract. In short, it seems to me that the mother has a
particular moral standing to demand that X account for his action.
I believe these two descriptions of the case should be taken at face
value. The mother does not have a claim-right against X—this is Hart’s
main point. But she is wronged by his action. If this is correct, then the
unstated premise that underwrites Hart’s inference must be incorrect. It
is not the case that one stands to be wronged only by those matters in
which one is owed something. Taking these descriptions seriously
means giving up the theoretical assumption that rights and wrongs are
inexorably linked.
One might, however, try to offer a different description that preserves
the connection between wrongs and rights. In particular, one might
suggest that the mother actually does have some sort of claim—
something that is owed to her—though perhaps in some more subtle
way. One might argue that our sense that the mother is wronged is based
18. For a nice discussion of the standing that third parties like the mother have to
forgive, see Glen Pettigrove, “The Standing to Forgive,” Monist 92 (2009).
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on her entitlement to rely on X or based on a duty of her son to take care
of her. Somehow, the thought goes, the mother has a claim of her own
that piggybacks on her son’s claim. One might thus attempt to resist the
idea that, insofar as the right is her son’s, it is not also hers.19
Even if one could make this idea work in the mother example, I believe
that reflection on additional examples makes this response seem
increasingly strained as a general explanation of third-party wrongs. One
can postulate more and more rights in order to maintain the correlation,
but only at the expense of a meaningful sense of what it is to have a right.
To begin with, one can construct a gift example in which no special
relationships of potential reliance or familial duty exist. Suppose that,
instead of aiding his mother, the son decides that he wants to perform a
random act of kindness by giving away most of his fortune. He assembles
a list of thousands of people who have somehow contributed to the
community—schoolteachers, nurses, veterans, and so on. At an event for
these people, one person’s name will be randomly drawn and a large
cash prize will be awarded. There will be one of those oversized checks
and confetti and whatnot. X has been hired to arrange everything. When
the name is finally drawn, it turns out to be you! But, in a Hollywood plot
twist, X is a skillful con man who has absconded with the money.20
It seems to me that you will consider yourself wronged by X. I would.
The feeling would not be merely the “Aw, shucks!” attitude that one
might have upon discovering that your ticket was one digit away from
winning the lottery. You would feel aggrieved, I think. If you ever met X,
you might have something to say to him.
Even though it is natural to see you as wronged, your complaint would
not have anything to do with any right of yours. Although it may feel as
though X has stolen money that was “as good as yours,” you did not
19. Frances Kamm suggests both the attraction and the difficulty with such an approach:
“What if my mother got only a derivative right contingent on my right? My waiver would give
me a power to revoke her right and so would be the dominant right. Yet it would not be the
only right. But if she had such a right, why is she unable to singlehandedly waive the right (as
I can) rather than merely set conditions for its being acted on?” Frances Kamm, “Rights,” in
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law, ed. Jules Coleman and Scott
Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 481–82.
20. For an actual case that is structurally similar though involving family, see White v.
Jones [1995] UKHL 5. Two daughters sued after a solicitor failed to follow their father’s
instructions in drawing up a modified will. The court found that the solicitor was liable to
the daughters even though they were not owed contractual or fiduciary duties.
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actually have a property right.21 Nor would your complaint be based on
any reliance on your part, because you did not rely on receiving the
money. Nor would it be based on some relationship that you had with
the son, because you have no substantive relationship with the son
whatsoever.
As the earlier point about contract law suggests, there is one relation-
ship that you do have with the son: that of being his intended benefi-
ciary. Of course, this is a looser sense of “intended” than in the case of the
mother, in that he did not really intend you as his beneficiary as much as
he intended whoever it was whose name got pulled out of the lottery.
Still, one might cling to the piggybacking thought by asserting that you
have a right because the son has a right and you are the one who was
supposed to be the beneficiary. The trouble is that this relationship is so
flimsy.22 It amounts to little more than a placeholder for the idea that you
stand to be wronged depending on whether his contract is fulfilled. It is
not a meaningful right in any other way. I will return to this thought.
IV. CASE TWO: THE OVERHEARD LIE
That the rightholder and the injured party need not be connected at all
is, I think, ultimately correct. There need be no particular ex ante rela-
tionship between the person to whom the duty is owed—that is, the
rightholder—and the person who ends up being wronged by its viola-
tion. Consider a second class of cases, involving the indirect receipt of
false testimony. Suppose that you overhear your coworker talking to a
customer at work. Your coworker tells the customer that the South
Bridge has been fixed and is now operational. You do not think anything
of it at the time. Later that day, you are suffering from an asthma attack
21. In regard to ownership, the difference between “yours” and “all but yours” is critical.
Rights serve to distinguish a point at which the property shifts from being one person’s to
another’s. Up until such a point is reached, a person does not have a right to the property.
After that point, the original owner must give up the right in question. Of course, all
associated rights need not transfer at once. Some aspects of ownership can transfer before
others. But with regard to any particular normative power—any “stick in the bundle” as
lawyers would put it—it must lie with one person or another. For this reason, a vested right
is very different from one that is merely anticipated.
22. The son might only have wanted to give the money away for a tax benefit or as a
public relations stunt—that you benefit might have been insignificant to him. The example
relies on a confluence of your interests with the son’s rights, but that confluence could be
entirely incidental.
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and need to rush to the hospital. You try to take the South Bridge only to
find it closed, and you end up in a great deal of distress. The next day, you
ask your coworker why he said the South Bridge was fixed. Your
coworker responds by saying that he was lying because he does not like
the customer and wanted to play a prank on him.
It seems to me that you can reasonably complain to your coworker
about his actions—you would not be mistaken in feeling wronged. The
familiar package of emotions and practices would seem to apply: resent-
ment, apology, forgiveness, and so on. This is not, however, because the
coworker violates your rights in any obvious way.
For a real example presenting a similar problem about third parties
and duties of truth, consider Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School
District.23 The case arose after a thirteen-year-old girl was sexually
assaulted by her vice principal. The girl sued the former employer of the
vice principal because the former employer had given unreservedly posi-
tive references for the vice principal despite knowing about prior charges
of sexual misconduct and impropriety. That is, she sued alleging that the
prior employer had wronged her by lying in the reference that it gave to
others. The court found the former employer liable.
The reader inclined to preserve the correlation between rights and
wrongs is likely to appeal to a different explanation for the wrong in this
type of case. It will be noted that your coworker and the former employer
both seem to have been negligent in spreading their falsehoods.24 In
seeking some right of yours that the coworker violates, for example, a
natural candidate is a right not to be negligently harmed—or, more spe-
cifically, negligently subjected to false information.25 Your coworker
23. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
24. Negligently spreading falsehoods can involve two different things: being negligent
about uttering statements that one knows to be false or being negligent about determining
the truth of one’s statements. In my examples, the parties knew what they said to be false,
so the negligence I am considering here would be the former type.
25. Although we sometimes talk about a right not to be negligently harmed, it can
obscure matters. Negligently harming does not describe an intentional act and, therefore,
is not per se something that we can demand that others refrain from doing. What we can
demand is that others should take due care, that is, precautions. So when we talk of a right
not to be negligently harmed, I think that we should be focused on the right to have certain
precautions taken. Against this view, a right not to be negligently harmed might be under-
stood as not actually involving a right to certain precautions. On this understanding, one
can avoid violating the right either by taking precautions or by getting lucky and not
harming anyone. But this makes the right look like something that can neither be claimed
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ought, according to this line of thought, to have recognized the possible
harms of such an action. His failure toward you is one of carelessness. It
might here be suggested that your coworker would not have wronged
you if he had taken every precaution not to be overheard and had been
foiled only by your eavesdropping. Thus, he is in a position to wrong you
only because he did not take such precautions.
There is, I recognize, an obligation not to spread false information
negligently. For example, if one is rehearsing a play that bystanders
might mistake for reality, one ought to take precautions to do so in
private. It is not outlandish to suggest that this same obligation underlies
the wrong in the example of the overheard lie. But there are two signifi-
cant problems for such a proposal.
First, even granting that there is an obligation not to spread false-
hoods negligently, this obligation does not seem to be the basis for your
complaint. In asserting your grievance, you would likely be asking, “Why
did you lie?” It would not simply be, “Why didn’t you make sure that I
couldn’t hear you?” One piece of evidence that negligence toward you is
not really the issue is that the coworker could not answer your complaint
by saying, “I could never have foreseen that you would overhear me.”
Even if that were true—perhaps the room had bizarre acoustics like the
whispering galleries in St. Paul’s Cathedral and in the U.S. Capitol—it
would not really answer the complaint. In this way, the overheard lie is
unlike the overheard play rehearsal or other mere negligence. Whereas
the duty to avoid foreseeably spreading false information exhausts the
conduct for which the rehearsing actors can be held accountable, the
coworker can be held accountable aside from that—for having lied and
for the consequences of that lie.26 In this way, the wrong does not seem to
be only about negligence.
in advance nor be used to guide one’s action. Beforehand, I cannot demand that you do
anything on account of it, and it does not tell you to do anything either. It gives no real
directive whatsoever. Instead, it is a placeholder for the relations that will exist ex post if
you have not taken precautions and you are not lucky. As will be discussed in Section VII,
part of my argument is that, once we start thinking of rights in these placeholder ways, they
lose their action-guiding qualities.
26. A number of philosophers have commented on the way that even unforeseen bad
consequences can be imputed to our actions when we breach an obligation. Kant wrote,
“the bad results of a wrongful action . . . can be imputed to the subject.” Immanuel Kant,
The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 6:228. Anscombe contends that it is a mistake to think that “you can exculpate
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Even if this problem could be somehow finagled, there is a second.
Supposing that there is an obligation not to spread falsehoods negli-
gently, it is not clear that this is an obligation that is correlative to a right.
Although the liar or the actor should perhaps be cognizant of potential
bystanders, a bystander would not necessarily be able to claim an
entitlement to be shielded from the falsehoods, as in, “You owe it to me
to do that behind closed doors.” Notice here how the theoretical insis-
tence on postulating a right to correlate with every wrong draws one into
a proliferation of rights. A commonsense inventory of rights—the things
that we might reasonably demand of another person—is unlikely to
include a right that others not lie in our proximity, or even more
strangely, a right that others take due care in arranging privacy when
they decide to promulgate lies. Trying to find a right to explain the wrong
proliferates rights unnaturally.
The unconvinced reader may think that my argument now trades on
shifting, to suit my purposes, between two possible ways of thinking
about the case. Either the bystander was wronged insofar as there was a
right against negligence, or the bystander was not wronged insofar as
there was no right. Either there is a wrong traceable to a right, or there is no
wrong at all. Suitably specified, the case would turn out to be one or the
other.
But my argument is that we should not foreclose a third possibility.
Imagining only two possibilities is too limiting. It forces us say either that
the relevant precautions were actions the bystander could demand in
advance or that the bystander was not wronged at all. But this, I think, is
inadequately textured. Sometimes we are not in a position to demand
conduct in advance and yet we end up wronged after events unfold. In at
least some bystander situations, an ex ante demand—“You owe it to me
[bystander] to be speaking the truth now”—would not be appropriate,
though an ex post complaint would be once the injury has been suffered.
This is because the ex post complaint need not take the symmetric form,
yourself from the actual consequences of the most disgraceful actions, so long as you can
make out a case for not having foreseen them.” Instead, she argues, “a man is responsible
for the bad consequences of his bad actions.” G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philoso-
phy,” Philosophy 33 (1958): 12. Ordinary negligence involves a failure to guard against
foreseeable harms. But in cases like the overheard lie, the wrong is not based on a failure to
protect against foreseeable harms—it is based on the consequence, foreseeable or not, of a
wrongful action.
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“You owed it to me [bystander] to tell the truth.” It may instead take the
form, “You shouldn’t have lied and now you’ve screwed things up for
me.” Insisting that there are only two possibilities—either there is a right
or not—does not allow for any such asymmetric ex post complaint. The
asymmetry requires a third possibility: the bystander may suffer a wrong
not traceable to a right of his or her own.
V. CASE THREE: THE INJURED BYSTANDER
The fact that the wrong to a third party often cannot be explained by
some right that one not be negligently harmed is particularly clear when
the primary rights violation is itself one of negligence. This leads to a
third type of case, exemplified by the well-known legal decision in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.27
In Palsgraf, a railroad company’s employees negligently pushed a
passenger onto a train, causing the passenger to drop the package he was
carrying. The traveler’s package turned out to contain fireworks, which
exploded. The explosion caused a metal scale to fall over, which landed
on Mrs. Palsgraf, injuring her.
In a famous opinion dismissing Mrs. Palsgraf’s lawsuit against the
railroad company, Judge Benjamin Cardozo explained that, although the
railroad breached a duty to the owner of the package, the railroad did not
breach any duty owed to Mrs. Palsgraf. He explained—correctly, I
think—that the injury to Mrs. Palsgraf was unforeseeable, that “[t]he risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed,” and that,
therefore, the law could not say that the railroad employee owed a duty
to Mrs. Palsgraf. Cardozo inferred, however, from this point about direc-
tional duties, that Mrs. Palsgraf could not assert any complaint of her
own. That is, because she was not a rightholder, she had no basis for
complaining that she had been wronged. This inference is premised on
precisely the principle that I mean to challenge. Cardozo’s reliance on
this assumption, I think, was incorrect. Perhaps other considerations
might justify not granting Mrs. Palsgraf’s legal relief.28 But Cardozo’s
27. 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
28. There may be reasons, in administering a legal system, that one would not want to
allow legal redress for every moral wrong. Pragmatic considerations might press toward
cutting off inquiry into circuitous causal chains at some point. In this sense, legal wrongs
could be different from moral wrongs, but I do not read this to have been Cardozo’s point.
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reasoning—that only a rightholder can be wronged—is deeply mistaken,
even if it has become canonical.
To see the difficulty, consider the facts of Flanders v. Cooper,29 a more
modern case from the Maine Supreme Court. A physical therapist alleg-
edly used highly atypical methods, including hypnotism, for treatment
of a joint disorder, which negligently implanted false memories of sexual
abuse in the patient’s mind. The patient’s father, against whom these
allegations of abuse were made, attempted to sue the therapist. The
court held that, assuming the treatment was negligent, duties regarding
medical treatment are exclusively between the patient and therapist, so
no duties to the father were present.30 The court therefore dismissed the
father’s complaint.
When this case is viewed strictly from a moral perspective—that is,
leaving aside the practicalities of running a legal system31—I think that it
should seem almost bizarre to claim that the father could not be
wronged here. This incident quite possibly ruined his life. Assuming the
allegations against the physical therapist to be true, I think we would—
and should—say that the therapist wronged the father. And yet, at the
same time, the court’s premise that a physician’s duties run uniquely to
the patient looks hard to deny. Admittedly, there are some duties that the
physical therapist did owe to the father. For example, the physical thera-
pist owed a duty not to make defamatory statements about him; the
physical therapist also owed a duty not to send the daughter home with
29. 706 A.2d 589 (Me. 1998).
30. The court contrasted duties regarding treatment methods with duties to warn,
which might be owed to third parties: “Unlike the duty to warn . . . the duty that Flanders
advocates is a duty of medical treatment that goes to the core of the relationship between
a patient and a health care professional. . . . Our recognition of the duty Flanders advocates
. . . would intrude directly on the professional-patient relationship.” 706 A.2d at 591. For a
decision similarly rejecting liability for third parties injured by negligent medical treatment
but offering a more explicit discussion of Palsgraf, see Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333,
1338–39 (D. Colo. 1983), which held that, even if the treatment offered by John Hinkley’s
therapist “fell below the applicable standard of care,” the therapist could not be liable to
those injured in Hinkley’s assassination attempt.
31. The Flanders court was notably concerned with the policy implications of imposing
liability. After explaining that medical treatment is between the patient and doctor, the
court explained that it was “also concerned that recognition of the duty urged by Flanders
would undermine . . . efforts to uncover and to investigate possible instances of child
abuse.” 706 A.2d at 591.
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a weapon if she was unstable.32 But these duties are precisely the kind of
thing that the father could demand at the time—“you owe it to me not to
do that.” The choice of treatment seems unlike that. While the physical
therapist did have a duty not to provide improper treatment, that was
something that he owed to the daughter. So I think that we should
say—as the court did—that the father did not have a right over what
treatment his daughter received.
I suggest that we should see these two claims—that the father was
wronged and that the father was not the rightholder—as compatible. It is
true that the duty to provide a responsible treatment was owed to the
patient. Similarly, in Palsgraf, the duty of care was owed to the passen-
ger, not to Mrs. Palsgraf. But these points about to whom the duty was
owed—about who is properly viewed as the rightholder—do not neces-
sarily dictate who stands to be wronged by a transgression. To the extent
that it makes a contrary conceptual claim, Cardozo’s iconic opinion
strikes me as incorrect.
VI. CASE FOUR: THE LOVED ONE
What cases like Palsgraf and Flanders suggest is that we can have a stake
in what happens to another person without having a right over what
happens. We may have this stake because we chance to be on the same
railroad platform. But it will often be because we care about the other
person.
The philosophical assumption that rights and wrongs are necessarily
connected has an attractive simplicity to it. Whether we are wronged
maps onto whether we had a claim to begin with, and vice versa. But the
moral world is not always so clean and simple. Shakespeare—a great
student of life’s complexities—was attentive to the fact that we are some-
times wronged by actions done to others, not just by conduct directly
owed to ourselves. Consider two of the many wrongs that he depicts. In
Much Ado about Nothing, Leonato says that he is wronged by the false
accusations Claudio makes against his daughter:
32. It may be tempting to try to explain the wrong to her by reference to one or another
of these duties. But they are inadequate for that task. Although details are scarce, it is quite
plausible that the physical therapist never made false statements about the father that
would count as defamation. And, while the plaintiff argued that giving the daughter hyp-
notism was reckless toward third parties—in the way that sending her out with a gun might
be—that argument is strained and the court understandably rejected it.
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LEONATO: Marry, thou dost wrong me, thou dissembler, thou . . .
Know, Claudio, to thy head,
Thou hast so wronged mine innocent child and me
That I am forced to lay my reverence by,
And with gray hairs and bruise of many days
Do challenge thee to trial of a man.33
In Julius Caesar, Cassius believes himself wronged by Brutus’s condem-
nation of a man whom Cassius had supported:
CASSIUS: That you have wronged me doth appear in this:
You have condemned and noted Lucius Pella
For taking bribes here of the Sardinians;
Wherein my letters praying on his side
Because they knew the man, was slighted off.34
What Shakespeare knew is that our stake in actions done to others
often makes us vulnerable to those actions as well. We are wronged not
only by what is done to us, but by what is done to our daughters, or our
friends, or even strangers with whom our lives just happen to become
connected.
Consider what I take to be a very simple but clear example of a wrong
without an underlying right: the parent who loses a child to a drunk
driver. The drunk driver violates the child’s rights to a safe roadway. That
is, the direct rights violation here is to the child. But I think any reason-
able person would say that the parent is also wronged by the drunk
driver—just as Leonato feels wronged in Much Ado about Nothing. This
is not because the parent has a right that the drunk driver not be negli-
gent toward his or her child. And the parent is not wronged because the
drunk driver should have taken due care to be sure that anyone he might
kill not have caring family. The parent is wronged even though there is
no right of his or hers that has been violated.35
33. Much Ado about Nothing, Arden edition (London: Thompson Learning, 2006),
5.1.53–66.
34. Julius Caesar, Arden edition (London: Thompson Learning, 1998), 4.3.1–5.
35. I am suggesting that the parent is wronged not because he or she had a right
violated, but because of the harm that was caused by a wrongful action. This puts
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VII. RIGHTS AS ACTION-GUIDING
I have been arguing that third parties can be wronged even though it is
someone else who holds the right that has been violated. I have tried to
suggest that positing a right in such third parties, in order to maintain
the correlation of wrongs with rights violations, is both awkward and
artificial.
The concern with positing such rights is not merely a matter of con-
ceptual tidiness or tracking our folk intuitions. We have important theo-
retical commitments about rights playing a role in moral reasoning.
These commitments cut against positing rights to explain all the cases of
third-party wrongs.
Rights, I believe, are significant mainly because they are action-
guiding. That is, they tell an agent something about what she should do;
they give her reasons. As Hohfeld famously made clear, rights correlate
with duties.36 When one party has a right against another, the other party
is bound by a duty owed to the first. Duty is a normative notion—it
describes what one ought to do. If you owe a duty, you have a certain
kind of reason—perhaps especially pressing or second-personal or
exclusive of others. So rights, correlative to duties, play a role in our
deliberations about what to do. They give us reasons, presumably
reasons of a special kind.
I do not believe that the rights that we might posit to retain a correla-
tion between rights and wrongs serve this deliberative function. Con-
sider the example of the parent wronged by the injury to the child—the
parent of the drunk driver’s victim or Leonato when his daughter is
slandered. One might simply posit that a parent has a right against
the weight—correctly, I think—on the emotional connection and not on the formal rela-
tionship. This may, however, appear wildly overinclusive, as a total stranger might be
caused emotional harm—perhaps because of an irrational attachment to the child or
because hearing about the event triggers memories of a wrong done to him or her. Some
readers may view this as a crippling problem. To my mind, it is a virtue of the view that it
appreciates the unpredictability and expansiveness of potential wrongs and casts focus
back on the hard questions about causation. To what extent we should say that a stranger’s
trauma is caused by the wrongdoer or should be attributed to something else—the irratio-
nal attachment or the mistreatment received in the past—strikes me as a difficult but
appropriately confronted question.
36. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, ed. Walter Wheeler Cook (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1919).
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having his or her child wrongfully injured or killed. Along these lines, the
law sometimes posits a “right to consortium” that is violated when one’s
spouse is injured or killed.37 A right like this could explain how the parent
is wronged, and the correlation between rights and wrongs would be
held intact by hypothesizing such a right. But such a right, I mean to
argue, would not be action-guiding.38 If we posit such rights, we must
give up on the idea that rights are normative—that the presence of rights
affects our deliberation about what to do.
This claim may be surprising. One might think that, in positing these
rights, we are basically saying that this is something that the agent
should have thought about—for example, the drunk driver should have
thought about the spouse or parent that he might wrong. But this is
precisely what I mean to deny. Potential wrongs are, I mean to suggest,
normatively inert; they do not provide us with reasons to think about as
we deliberate.39 And, even if they do, they do not provide rights-like
reasons.
To see the point, consider an example. Suppose that as a hobby you
engage in recreational pyrotechnics. That is, you enjoy spending your
Saturday afternoons setting off various elaborate explosives and
37. See, for example, Fitzsimmons v. Mini Coach of Boston, Inc., 440 Mass. 1028 (2003):
“A loss of consortium claim presupposes a legal right to consortium of the injured person.”
This is an excellent example of erroneously positing a right in order to reach the correct
result. We generally believe that someone is wronged by the wrongful killing or harming of
a spouse, which is why we allow such a legal right. But the right itself—implying that one
has a right over one’s spouse—is a problematic holdover from a time when wives were seen
as husband’s property. When loss of consortium figured more prominently, there would be
a parallel tort for alienation of affection. In part because of a discomfort with such rights,
many common law jurisdictions have abolished actions for loss of consortium, considering
it antiquated or even misogynistic. See Sharman v. Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, 598 (Austl.).
Modern wrongful death statutes again create an action for loss of a family member, but
should not be read to create a right to one’s family member.
38. I do not mean to deny that wrongs to third parties may be foreseeable such that they
might figure into deliberation. One might foresee the injury to a parent or a spouse or,
perhaps, a third-party rescuer. My claim, as I develop it below, is that these potential
wrongs are not the proper focus of the deliberating agent.
39. This is not to say that potential wrongs are motivationally inert. A person may
sometimes be moved to ϕ by considering the potential wrongs that failing to ϕ might
produce. Telling a serial killer that you have a mother named Doris might shake his inten-
tion to kill you, but I do not think that he now has any more reason not to kill you than he
had before.
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fireworks. There is a secluded plot of land where you and other local
enthusiasts often practice. This is legally permitted, and there are signs
notifying people to beware. There is, however, an obligation to broadcast
a loud warning message before detonating any device. One day, you go
out to the park and set up an elaborate explosive display. The display is
on a timer to allow you time to get safely away from it. For some reason,
today it slips your mind to broadcast the warning signal. After you have
walked away and are looking back, you see that two familiar local chil-
dren have approached the device. One is a girl who has no family and no
one who cares for her. The other is a boy with extremely loving parents
who would be absolutely heartbroken if he is injured or killed. You have
enough time to get one child away from the device, but probably not
both.
Both children have a right to be saved. And whichever child you do not
save will certainly have been wronged by your negligence. But if we
accept the rights-based solution to the third-party cases—if parents have
a right that their children not be wrongfully injured or killed—then addi-
tional rights will be violated if you save the familyless girl. The rights of
not only the little boy but also his parents are at stake. This conclusion
follows directly from the fact that the boy’s parents would be wronged if
he were killed, as long as one assumes that being wronged and having a
right necessarily go hand in hand.
I believe, however, that the fact that the little boy’s parents stand to be
wronged does not play any role in what you should do—and it certainly
does not play the action-guiding role that we would like rights to play,
which is all that my argument requires. Consider, first, whether the
potential wrong to the parents should be treated as a reason to save the
little boy. There are balanced reasons for saving each child. The fact that
failing to save the boy would also wrong some related parties does not
seem to provide any further reason. It is no reason at all. It would be
erroneous—perhaps downright pernicious—to think that the existence
of the parents can decide between the otherwise evenly balanced claims
of the two children. It is not something that you should think about.
Whatever status the parents have, it does not appear to inform your
choice.
Now, admittedly, this is a complex case. The fact that one should not,
on account of the parents, choose the boy over the familyless girl does
not, on its own, conclusively show that the potential wrong to the
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parents provides no reason.40 It would be a mistake to assume that the
weights of reasons can always be added. There are many ethical contexts
in which an additional reason will not settle or even bear on a decision.
Many things that generally do provide a reason—say, the opportunity to
save a friend’s crystal vase—could not be used to settle the choice
between the girl and the boy. So perhaps the potential wrong to the
parents similarly provides a reason, but one that is outweighed or
silenced or redundant or otherwise inoperative in this particular context.
Though this general response may sound plausible, I think there are
strong grounds for doubting that this is what is happening here. First, the
potential wrong to the parents is no comparatively small matter like a
vase; killing someone’s child may be about as grievous an injury as one
can inflict. If it were a reason, one would think that it would be a fairly
significant one. So that closes off at least one natural explanation for why
the parents cannot play a tiebreaking role.41 Second, it is not clear that
there is any sense or context in which the wrong to the parents would
matter to deliberation. While a reason need not function as a tiebreaker,
40. Mark Schroeder argues that we should be wary of negative existential intuitions
about reasons, and I concede that I am offering just such an argument. See Mark
Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 92–97. Still,
my argument should at least shift the burden onto the person who wants to claim that there
is a reason to explain in what sense there is a reason.
41. As Frances Kamm has pointed out, there seems to be something perverse about
deciding which person to save based on the tiebreaking fact that you could cure some
third party’s sore throat. Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), pp. 61–63. One might think that the parents’ case is like that one: in the face of the
tie between the rights of each child, the parents’ claim is “an irrelevant good” relative to
the children’s rights. I think this is mistaken for a couple of reasons. First, a parent’s grief
is not comparatively small, on a par with a sore throat. Kamm accepts that if a third party
stands to lose his legs, then that fact can serve as a tiebreaker. But I suspect that most
parents would prefer to lose their legs than their child. Second, in the sore throat case,
there is not the same asymmetry between wrongs and reasons. What motivates Kamm’s
conclusion in the sore throat case is the thought that the person suffering from the sore
throat would not be wronged if you do not cure her sore throat—she would have no
complaint. Kamm says that the important question is, “Would the tiebreaker have a com-
plaint for his own sake, based on the seriousness of his own need, if he does not break
the tie?” Kamm, Intricate Ethics, p. 62. The sore throat is not a reason because it would
not be a cause for complaint. But in the pyrotechnics case, the parents would be wronged
and would have a complaint, and yet this fact does not correlate with any additional
reason.
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it must be capable of functioning in some way or in some context.42
Perhaps, one might suggest, we should view the parents as providing a
reason contrastively: the potential wrong to the parents does not provide
a reason to save the boy over the girl, but it does provide a reason to save
the boy rather than do nothing. But does it? It seems to me that the boy
and his rights provide all the reason to save.
Alternatively, one might suggest that the parents provide a reason
counterfactually. This is the sense in which the crystal vase provides a
reason: if it were not for the children, then the vase would be a relevant
consideration. One might suggest something similar about the parents:
if the boy’s rights were not present, then the wrong to the parents would
matter. Were it not for the boy’s rights, however, there would not be a
wrong to the parents at all. Suppose, for example, that the explosion
would not kill the boy but would cover him in permanent ink, and that
the boy were old enough to consent to this.43 Insofar as it is not a viola-
tion of his rights, then there is no wrong to the parents. This is why I have
used a case that involves preempting one’s own wrongful action.44 If
there were not something to make the action wrongful antecedently,
then there would not be a potential wrong to the third party. A potential
wrong to a third party only exists if there are already reasons in place
sufficient to dictate one’s decision. This is true in all of the third-party
wrongs considered thus far. The coworker ought not lie, irrespective of
the overhearer; the railroad employee ought not be negligent, irrespec-
tive of Mrs. Palsgraf; and so on. The fact that an act would wrong
42. For a discussion of the idea that reasons must count in favor of action, at least
counterfactually, see John Broome, “Reasons,” in Wallace, Scheffler, Smith, Reason and
Value, pp. 28–55.
43. This modification is necessary because it is hard to imagine what it would mean for
someone, especially a child, not to have a right not to be killed. But, if capital punishment
is ever justifiable, then I do not think that the executioners wrong the parents of those
executed. The point is that the wrong to the family member only comes onto the scene
when there is already a direct rights violation, and that direct violation provides all the
reasons. Note that, in this way, potential wrongs do not have the same structure as the kind
of latent reasons that Schroeder considers. Unlike, for example, my reason to eat my car for
its iron content, which persists in the background or not, potential wrongs only come onto
the scene once there is already decisive reason not to do something.
44. The case might avoid this by simply asking whether you should kill the beloved boy
or the familyless girl. But that would prompt the question, why should you kill either one?
Why violate anyone’s rights? The case as I have presented it takes that question out of the
equation by making the rights violation a fait accompli.
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someone (or someone additional) does not, I think, count as yet another
reason. It is not that the third parties are morally irrelevant, but that,
from the deliberative perspective, the wrongs they might suffer are
epiphenomenal.45 If this is correct, then the presence of the third parties
is not a reason and does not guide our action.46
Even if I am wrong about this and the potential wrong to the parents
is a reason in some capacious sense, my argument actually requires only
a second, weaker point: the potential wrong to the parents is not a reason
of the special kind that rights should generate. The potential wrong to
the parents is not associated with any ex ante claim on your conduct. The
parents could not (properly) demand that you save their child at the
expense of the familyless girl. Of course, they would hope for such a
choice, but it would be wholly inappropriate to assert that you owe it to
them to make such a choice. Nor should you consider yourself to owe it.
Believing oneself obligated to the parents to choose the little boy over the
familyless girl would be an inappropriate way to respond to the potential
wrong one might do to the parents. It would be to treat as demanding a
consideration that is not entitled to that status, elevating the parents
from stakeholders to claimholders. To do so misapprehends the signifi-
cance of the parents. They do not have an ex ante entitlement that guides
your choice of conduct. The bipolar moral relationship with the parents
exists only downstream. In deliberation, they are not significant in the
way that their having a right would imply.
45. Similarly, I would also say that the fact that an action would be regrettable or
blameworthy should not count as reasons not to perform the action. The reasons not to
perform the action are ingredients in making the action regrettable or blameworthy, so it
would be misguided to treat these features as further reasons.
46. Even if one accepts this understanding of the pyrotechnics case, one might doubt
whether this can really be true of all third-party wrongs. For example, if one were deciding
which among incompatible promises one is to break, then the potential wrong to the
beneficiary (for example, Hart’s mother) looks like it should be a reason to keep one over
another. There is much more to say about this case than I can offer here, but I think that it
involves unique features of promising and the strength of different promissory obligations.
In short, you may owe it more to one promisee than to another to keep the promise to him
because his beneficiary would be hurt. So, while the potential consequences to the ben-
eficiary may be relevant, that is different than saying that the potential wrong to the
beneficiary is providing a reason. It is still the rights doing the action-guiding work, I think.
But, even if this is incorrect, what is essential to my argument is that some wrongs are not
action-guiding, whereas rights should be.
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One might nevertheless insist that there are rights in these third-party
cases, just not rights that serve any ex ante function as claims on our
conduct. But understanding rights in this weaker way is unsatisfactory
for two reasons. First, such rights would not offer a meaningful
explanation of the wrongs. Positing rights was meant to explain the
wrongs in question, but, for them to be explanatory, the rights must be
independently significant. They cannot be mere placeholders for the
thing being explained. Second, by positing rights as essentially
placeholders to retain a correlation between wrongs and rights, we
denude rights of their normative importance. The cost of positing
rights to explain how third parties are wronged is giving up the idea
that rights are action-guiding. But part of the appeal in thinking of
morality in terms of directed duties is that it captures the sense that we
owe our attention to a particular person. Rights describe the ways that
others are normatively significant in shaping how we should act. When
one posits artificial rights as a placeholder for potential wrongs, one
loses this idea.
This problem is particularly clear in the parent-child cases, but I
think we have already seen evidence of it elsewhere. In the example of
the overheard lie, it seems awkward to posit a right not to have lies told
nearby. In some circumstances—such as the play rehearsal—one might
be guided by a duty not to spread falsehoods negligently. But this duty
seems ill equipped to explain the wrong done by the lie. The reason, I
think, is that we believe that the liar should be responding to the
rights of his conversational partner. Any third parties are essentially
beside the point. Rights, we think, should describe guiding features of
the moral landscape, items that an actor keeps in his deliberative
field of vision. The more we posit rights in third parties, the more this
is lost.
The importance of having rights play an action-guiding function has
also been touched upon in another way. In the example of the con man
absconding with the money for the charitable lottery, it was tempting to
explain the wrong done by noting that the con man is essentially stealing
from both the benefactor and the beneficiary at the same time. But the
difficulty with this temptation is that it seems to vest the same property
right in two parties at the same time. To do so is problematic because we
think that rights serve important allocative purposes. By describing who
has a right to various things, we allocate available entitlements. This
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allocative function depends on the action-guiding nature of rights. We
could say that both the benefactor and the beneficiary have a right that is
violated, but in doing so we would lose the idea that one or the other has
the power to govern our actions relating to the property. The right
would be a placeholder for future wrongs, not a marker of normative
control.
In sum, rights serve an important role in guiding how we act. Rights
tell us about how to treat one another. But if one posits rights for the
purpose of explaining the apparent wrongs against third parties, those
rights will not have this character. I believe that we are better off by
preserving this appealing conception of rights and abandoning the idea
that we can posit rights in the third-party cases.
VIII. INTEREST THEORIES AND WILL THEORIES
I have been arguing, based on concrete examples and considerations
about the role that rights and wrongs play in our moral lives, that we
should abandon the assumption that rights and wrongs are different
forms of the same moral relation. Thus far, my argument has been based
on the thought that such an assumption is incompatible with our every-
day understandings and practices. The argument has been presented as
a matter of casting aside a tempting theoretical assumption for the sake
of accuracy to our moral experience. To the extent that the reader has
accepted the argument, she may have done so only as a bitter pill that
must unfortunately be swallowed. In this section and the next, I want to
say something to alleviate this bitterness. I believe that the division
between rights and wrongs is connected with a natural division between
two different ways that people morally relate to one another. Thus, sepa-
rating rights and wrongs may be viewed not as a theoretical misfortune
but as a happy way to capture two otherwise competing thoughts about
morality.
Return to the debate between the interest theory and the will theory.
Hart’s example of the promise to take care of the mother constituted an
objection to the interest theory of rights. It illustrates that having an
interest that is protected by a duty is too weak to ground a right. Such a
theory gives out rights too freely. Because parties who are not in a posi-
tion to claim or waive a duty may nevertheless have an interest in its
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performance, the interest theory seems overinclusive. And although
more modern permutations of the interest theory have developed more
sophisticated ways of dealing with the third-party problem,47 the
problem persists.48
But the will theory has difficulties of its own. Not the least of these is
that the will theory can appear overly atomistic and adversarial. To hold
that we are all small-scale sovereigns of our own little domains is to carve
up the entire moral landscape into mutually exclusive spheres of influ-
ence. Rights, as a sort of moral property, begin to look like a zero-sum
game. My normative power comes only at the expense of your freedom,
and our interests become pitted against one another. In this way, the will
theory is the sort of thing that leads Marx to describe the rightholding
individual as an “isolated monad . . . withdrawn behind his private inter-
ests and whims and separated from the community.”49 The will theory—
when combined with the assumption that wrongs require rights
violations—thus creates an illusion that we only relate morally to one
another as separate individuals. Our accountability to one another
appears limited to not trespassing upon another’s sphere. This ignores
the fact that we live in communities and often have a stake in what is
done to one another. The will theory can thus seem to underappreciate
the social web in which we reside.
The virtues and vices of these two theories are the inverse of one
another. The interest theory seems valuable in its focus on the injury
involved in unjustified harm. The will theory, on the other hand, seems
correct in drawing our attention to the normative power of the
rightholder. But the interest theory produces too many rights claims, and
the will theory produces too little accountability to others.
I want to suggest that recognizing rights and wrongs as distinct offers
the possibility of seeing the interest theory and the will theory as describ-
ing different moral phenomena. The interest theory’s focus on injured
interests seems to be too broad to undergird an account of claims or
47. See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 165–86; Matthew Kramer, “Rights without
Trimmings,” in A Debate over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), pp. 60–100.
48. See, for example, the criticisms in Gopal Sreenivasan, “A Hybrid Theory of Claim-
Rights,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25 (2005): 257–74; Kamm, “Rights,” pp. 483–87.
49. Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David
McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 60–61.
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rights. But, as an account of complaints or wrongs, it is quite plausible. In
each of the examples that I have presented, the third party—be it
Shakespeare’s Leonato, the lottery recipient, the bystander who over-
hears a lie, or the parent of the child killed by the drunk driver—has a
major stake in the action of another. And in each case, the third party is
wronged not simply because he or she is harmed but because the other
person acts wrongfully. The wrong appears to consist in the
unjustifiability of the action in which the third party had some stake.50
The will theory, on the other hand, begins with the idea that a
rightholder has a special kind of normative influence. To have a right is
to have one’s choices command respect. In this sense, the will theory
provides an attractive picture of the sense in which rights are action-
guiding. But the will theory risks ignoring the implications that our
actions have for others. If rights and wrongs are not necessarily corre-
lated with each other, however, then rights need not crowd out the sig-
nificant stake that others have in our actions. By acknowledging that we
may wrong our fellow citizens even where they do not have a right
against us, we recognize that morality is not just about remaining con-
fined to our own little sphere. Rather, it acknowledges broader account-
ability rippling outward to the moral community.51
In short, treating rights and wrongs as distinct moral relationships has
the felicitous consequence that the interest theory and the will theory
50. I have deliberately used the construction “have some stake” because harm to inter-
ests, narrowly understood, may not be necessary for a wrong. I might violate a duty owed
to you, but in a way that does you no harm whatsoever. Arthur Ripstein offers various
examples of this phenomenon, which he refers to as “harmless trespass.” See, for example,
Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 44–46. In such cases, I take it that one still has
a stake in the action insofar as it is a violation of one’s rights. It would, of course, be circular
for a theory of rights to appeal to a general interest in having one’s rights respected, but I
am describing a theory of wrongs as distinct from rights. In general, I understand “having
a stake” to mean having something that answers the question, “What’s it to you?” This is
what grounds the standing to demand justification.
51. Admittedly, the view that I am defending retains a significant individualism, espe-
cially in comparison with some rights critics. My view is not that we are always accountable
to the community or that wrongful actions become “a wrong to the world at large,” as
Justice Andrews’s dissent in Palsgraf put it. Wrongs are, on my view, still attached to
particular individuals or groups. But they can extend beyond mere rightholders. In this
way, my view can be understood as an intermediate between the restrictive view that only
rightholding individuals stand to be wronged and the expansive view that the entire com-
munity is wronged. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this.
136 Philosophy & Public Affairs
may be understood not to be competing over the same conceptual ter-
ritory. They are, instead, focused on two different but equally real parts
of the moral landscape—roughly speaking, the will theory supplies an
account of claim-rights and the interest theory supplies an account of
wrongs. Philosophers have recently considered the debate between
interest theories and will theories to be “at an impasse”52 or to have
“ended in a standoff.”53 If there are really two moral relationships to be
described and accounted for, then this result is unsurprising. Each
theory may be correctly describing a different part of our moral lives.
IX. JUSTIFICATION AND RESPECT
I want to make one further suggestion as well, though I put it forward
more as hypothesis than as argument. I believe that the divide between
rights and wrongs and the divide between the interest theory and the will
theory both map onto a deeper distinction. In describing how an obli-
gation is owed to another person, philosophers often appeal to two
ideas: justification and respect. These two ideas are invoked, slightly
differently, to capture the directedness of our morality.
First, morality seems to demand that we be able to justify our actions
to one another.54 Many actions that adversely affect others are not nec-
essarily wrong—my dodging an errant frisbee may mean that it hits you
instead, my company’s success may diminish your profits, my loving
52. Rowan Cruft, “Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?” Law & Philosophy
23 (2004): 379.
53. Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): 223.
54. Many writers draw the connection between justifiability and the deontological
structure of morality. Thomas Nagel, for example, offers a sketch of rights-based reasoning
as giving a special centrality to justification to the other person: “[Utilitarian justifications]
are really justifications to the world at large, which the victim, as a reasonable man, would
be expected to appreciate. However, there seems to me something wrong with this view, for
it ignores the possibility that to treat someone else horribly puts you in a special relation to
him, which may have to be defended in terms of other features of your relation to him. . . .
If the justification for what one did to another person had to be such that it could be offered
to him specifically, rather than just to the world at large, that would be a significant source
of restraint.” Nagel, “War and Massacre,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1972): 137.
Contractualism picks up on this idea. Scanlon, for example, “takes the idea of justifiability
to be basic in two ways: this idea provides both the normative basis of the morality of right
and wrong and the most general characterization of its content.” T. M. Scanlon, What
We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998),
p. 189.
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someone else may break your heart, and so on. Harmful actions seem to
involve wronging only if they are unjustifiable—if I could have caught
the frisbee, if my commercial success was forged through underhanded
tactics, or if I led you on in your affections. Reflections of this sort natu-
rally suggest that what I owe to you is that my actions be justifiable to
you.
Second, moral obligations seem to be importantly connected with an
idea of respect for others.55 We have the sense that only certain treatment
constitutes a proper appreciation for your status as a person. I should
respond to your personhood by according your choices, needs, and
interests a special kind of normative significance. Rights, it is often
thought, reflect this special normative significance—they describe
constraints on how I may treat you, even if such treatment might be
otherwise advantageous. It is in this sense, the thought goes, that the
obligation is owed to you—it is not based on the balance of general
considerations but based exclusively on your status as a person. The
obligation characterizes what it means to respect you.
55. The connection between rights and respect is found in a range of theories, particu-
larly those with a Kantian heritage. Kant famously argued, “[A] human being regarded as a
person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price. . . .
Humanity in his person is the object of the respect which he can demand from every other
human being.” Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:434–35. Modern theorists have picked up
on this thought as an explanation for rights. Warren Quinn, for example, writes: “It is not
that we think it fitting to ascribe rights because we think it is a good thing that rights be
respected. Rather we think respect for rights a good thing precisely because we think
people actually have them—and . . . that they have them because it is fitting that they
should.” Warren Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), pp. 170–73. Robert Nozick appeals to the respect for the moral status of persons as a
way to explain the nonaggregative feature of right: “Side constraints express the inviola-
bility of other persons. But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? . . .
To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he
is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 30–33. Joel Feinberg argues that having rights
may simply amount to the ability to demand respect from others: “Having rights enables us
to ‘stand up like men,’ to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way equal
to anyone. To think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but properly proud,
to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be worthy of the love and esteem of
others. Indeed, respect for persons (this is an intriguing idea) may simply be respect for
their rights, so that there cannot be the one without the other; and what is called ‘human
dignity’ may simply be the recognizable capacity to assert claims.” Joel Feinberg, “The
Nature and Value of Rights,” Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1970): 252.
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What I want to suggest is that the difference between these two
ideas—justifiability and respect—corresponds with the difference
between wrongs and rights. Detaching wrongs from rights allows us to
capture these two fundamental moral relationships. Wrongs arise where
another person’s action affected us and is unjustifiable to us.56 Rights, in
contrast, are about the ways that other people’s deliberation and action
should be guided by respect for us and our choices. So, here too, distin-
guishing rights and wrongs may open the door to seeing different theo-
retical ideas as covering different parts of the moral landscape, not as
competing over the same territory.
Notice that one way in which the ideas of justifiability and respect
can be distinguished is by the perspectives that they represent. Justifi-
ability most naturally represents a backward-looking relationship. The
practice of giving or demanding justification presupposes an action
that is the subject of justification.57 Respect, in contrast, is typically
forward-looking. Respecting someone’s status as a person involves
giving that person a proper place in one’s deliberations. It describes
how one should be guided by another person’s moral significance
going forward.
An animating difference between wronging and rights also lies in their
temporal perspective. One perspective is irreducibly ex post: it considers
whether one person has done another an injustice. In looking back at an
action, we are concerned with whether that person has been treated in a
way that cannot be justified to him or her by the actor. Another perspec-
tive is irreducibly ex ante: it considers how one should be guided in an
action that has yet to be undertaken. Looking forward, respect for a
person’s status may demand giving him or her special significance in
one’s deliberation.
56. For the purposes of this article, I am only concerned with actions that are morally
unjustifiable. My thesis is that a person can be wronged by actions that are unjustifiable in
a way that is not traceable to a right of the harmed party. I have focused on morally
unjustifiable actions. It is an interesting question, beyond the scope here, whether we can
also sometimes resent and complain against violations of nonmoral norms (for example,
prudential or aesthetic norms) that adversely affect us.
57. It is true that, in a forward-looking manner, we can inquire whether an action could
be justified. But even this question seems to involve assuming something of a hypothetical
ex post perspective. Roughly speaking, it asks what could be said, if the action were per-
formed, to those affected.
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I do not want to create the impression that these perspectives are not
also related. Ex post justification will be deeply connected with what
reasons were present ex ante. This might produce a lingering worry
about my argument that rights and wrongs come apart. We can only
make out a case of ex post unjustifiable conduct by pointing
to the balance of ex ante reasons. And this seems to make the complaint
that one can make after the fact—“you shouldn’t have done that”—
resolve back into the ex ante considerations—“you should not do
this because. . . .” The wrongs in all of the cases considered look
plausible only insofar as some consideration against the action was there
beforehand.
The point that I have tried to extract from the third-party cases,
however, is that there can be an asymmetry in how we can invoke these
considerations. In each case that I have considered, an actor violates
someone’s right and some third party suffers adverse consequences.
Insofar as the action violated someone’s rights, it constituted acting
wrongly. Insofar as the action has an adverse consequence on the third
party, the third party then has a standing to complain about the unjus-
tified action. The actor becomes accountable to the third party for acting
wrongly, even though the considerations that made the action wrong did
not concern the third party. The third party’s complaint takes the form:
“You shouldn’t have done that, and now I’ve suffered as a result. I am not
saying that you shouldn’t have done it for my sake or out of respect for me,
but the effect on me now makes me one of the people you are account-
able to for having acted as you have.” This, I have tried to suggest, is a
perfectly coherent form of moral address. Though the same consider-
ations were present ex ante and ex post, the way in which they link the
parties changes. What was originally the rightholder’s to invoke becomes
something that the third party too can invoke. What was originally about
respect for the rightholder becomes a question of justification to
someone else.
In sum, I believe that distinguishing between wrongs and rights may
allow us to see otherwise competing thoughts about morality—the focus
on justification or respect, the interest theory and the will theory—as
describing different but equally real moral phenomena. My aim in
drawing these connections has been to gesture that, if reflection on
examples presses us toward divorcing rights and wrongs, this result need
not be philosophically distressing. It may actually be felicitous; such a
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distinction may connect with other, broader differences in the ways we
relate to one another morally.
X. MISTAKEN INFERENCES
I want to conclude by sketching the practical significance of the distinc-
tion that I have been drawing. Although how we categorize our moral
relations might appear purely academic, this appearance could not be
further from the truth. Rights and wrongs are bound up with a wealth of
practices and understandings. When it is appropriate to deploy these
practices and understandings is a matter of great practical importance,
and I do not want that to be lost.
I have been arguing that, by separating rights and wrongs, we can
accommodate two competing pulls. Thus we can say, with the will
theory, that the son to whom the contract is made is the rightholder, and
also, with the interest theory, that the mother is wronged by the violation
of the contract. What is at stake here is hardly just a matter of labeling.
Determining who is a rightholder affects questions about who can waive
or demand performance, and about the source and stringency of the
obligation in question. Determining who has been wronged implicates
other practical questions about who can complain, forgive, or seek
compensation, and about the moral costs and ramifications of an obli-
gation’s breach.
In seeking to answer practical questions like these—which arise in
innumerable legal, political, and everyday contexts—people routinely
draw inferences between rights and wrongs. On the one hand, a familiar
form of argument infers that a party cannot be wronged if that party did
not hold a right initially. As in Palsgraf and Flanders, a tortfeasor may
escape liability by arguing that the injured party was not the holder of the
right that was violated. Similarly, the government may avoid a defen-
dant’s complaint that evidence was unconstitutionally obtained if the
search did not violate the right of the defendant, even if it did violate the
rights of others.58 In political discourse, it is sometimes argued that a
disadvantaged group can have no complaint against a given social
58. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 169 n.2, 174 (1969).
141 Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties
arrangement on the grounds that the group has no right to assistance.59
In personal interactions, we might think that we can have no
complaint at being spurned because we had no right to affections or
friendship.60 If my thesis is correct, then all of these inferences are
unsound. Lacking a right does not preclude the possibility that one has
been wronged.
The opposite inference—from wrongs to rights—is equally mistaken.
It is tempting to think that every wrong can be traced to a rights violation.
Those concerned with injustice may therefore be inclined to posit rights.
We have already seen some examples of this temptation. The law, for
example, relies on a “right to consortium,” which it retains only for the
sake of acknowledging certain wrongs.61 And there is a temptation to say
that parents, when faced with the injury or death of their child, have a
right not to have their children harmed. Positing rights runs amok in
political discourse. The serious injustices in the world lead to a prolif-
eration of rights talk. But not every wrong—serious though it may be—is
founded upon a right that has been violated. The proliferation of rights
59. To pick on someone, consider the argument in Jon Elster, “Is There (or Should
There Be) a Right to Work?” in Democracy and the Welfare State, ed. Amy Guttman (Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 53–78. Elster argues that there is no right to
work and that the unemployed do not have a claim against society on the basis of their
unemployment. But it seems to me that the important question is not whether the unem-
ployed have a right to work but whether they can complain against society for their situa-
tion. It may be correct that individuals do not have a right to work, but it does not follow
that we do not wrong those whom society leaves unemployed. It may be—indeed, I suspect
it is—the agenda of those who describe a right to work to suggest the sense in which society
fails to do right by those who are left unemployed. It seems to me that Elster’s argument
does little to address this question.
60. In Anna Karenina, Levin says to himself: “Yes, she was bound to choose him. So
it had to be, and I have nothing and no one to complain about. I am myself to
blame. What right did I have to think she would want to join her life with mine?” Leo
Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York:
Penguin, 2000), p. 84. In saying this, Levin infers naturally from the fact that he had no
right to Kitty’s affection the conclusion that he can have no complaint when she rejects
his suit. Tolstoy’s reader, however, may not be so convinced. As another example,
Anthony Trollope describes the situation of a character as follows: “Frank Greystock was
not her lover. . . . She had no right to say to anyone that the man was her lover. She had
no right to assure herself that he was her lover. But she knew that some wrong was done
her in that he was not her lover.” Anthony Trollope, The Eustace Diamonds (London:
Asher, 1872), p. 73.
61. The “rights” of third-party beneficiaries in contract law—which amount to little
more than the standing to complain—may be another example. See Nicolas Cornell, “The
Puzzle of the Beneficiary’s Bargain,” Tulane Law Review 90 (forthcoming).
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comes at the expense of confusing what obligations we really have and to
whom we really owe these obligations.
We are better off, I have argued, recognizing that our ex ante and ex
post moral relations with one another are not simply different perspec-
tives on the same underlying moral connection. Being wronged and
having a right are not opposite sides of the same coin. Instead, they
represent two different ways in which persons can relate to one another
morally.
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